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Abstract—Graph-based assessment formalisms have proven to
be useful in the safety, dependability, and security communities
to help stakeholders manage risk and maintain appropriate
documentation throughout the system lifecycle. In this paper,
we propose a set of methods to automatically construct security
argument graphs, a graphical formalism that integrates various
security-related information to argue about the security level of
a system. Our approach is to generate the graph in a progressive
manner by exploiting logical relationships among pieces of di-
verse input information. Using those emergent argument patterns
as a starting point, we define a set of extension templates that can
be applied iteratively to grow a security argument graph. Using
a scenario from the electric power sector, we demonstrate the
graph generation process and highlight its application for system
security evaluation in our prototype software tool, CyberSAGE.
I. INTRODUCTION
Critical public infrastructure systems, such as those found in
the electric power and water sectors, must operate safely and
reliably for decades. During their operating lifetimes, these
systems are often modified to face evolving operating condi-
tions and requirements. For example, infrastructure systems
have adopted greater communication and control capabilities
in recent years. However, while these advanced features enable
greater system visibility and more efficient control strategies,
they also open new avenues for malicious attacks on the
system [1], [2], [17].
To understand evolving system requirements, operational
contexts, and/or security threats, practitioners often employ
graph-based reasoning techniques. Such approaches include
safety cases [8], [6], [5], fault tree analysis [19], [14], [21], and
attack trees/graphs [15], [16], [13], [11], [9]. Historically, de-
velopment and maintenance of those graphical approaches re-
quired significant human effort. Recently, several efforts have
begun in the safety and reliability communities to automate
those processes [6], [5], [14], [21]. However, in the security
domain, automation has been largely restricted to specific
applications, such as construction of attack graphs [13]. The
various challenges about security assessment were discussed
in, e.g., [12], [18].
Our approach for conducting holistic security assessment is
to develop security argument graphs, a graphical formalism
that integrates diverse inputs—including workflow informa-
tion for processes executed in the system, physical network
topology, and attacker models—to argue about the level of
security for the target system. In our earlier work [4], we
presented an integrative security assessment framework that
reasons about security by progressively combining heteroge-
neous types of information to construct such holistic security
argument graphs. Section II will recap the proposed framework
and describe the unique structure of the generated security
argument graphs.
Such holistic security argument graphs are beneficial in mul-
tiple ways: they make explicit the functional interdependecies
of different pieces of security-related information; also, the
graph structure can be used to combine various numerical
evidence to yield holistic quantitative security metrics.
In this paper, we provide a rigorous set of methods for
constructing the holistic argument graphs introduced in [4].
We leverage recurring argument patterns that emerge from the
need to integrate heterogeneous information about a system
and possible attacks, and instantiate them as extension tem-
plates that can be iteratively and automatically applied to grow
our argument graphs. Using our Cyber Security Argument
Graph Evaluation (CyberSAGE) tool [20], which is currently
under development, we demonstrate the automated graph
generation for an example electric power grid system [3].
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Sec-
tion II reviews our assessment framework and the structure
of the resulted security argument graphs. In Section III, we
present the argument patterns that can be used to generate such
argument graphs. In Section IV, we formalize the argument
patterns as extension templates. In Section V, we show how
to use these extension templates to automate the argument
graph construction process. A practical example of the graph
construction is presented in Section VI, with a use case
from the electric power sector. We discuss related work in
Section VII, and conclude in Section VIII.
II. SECURITY ARGUMENT GRAPHS
Many safety [8], reliability [19], and security [10] assess-
ment methodologies rely on graphical structures to organize
and present information. In a security context, such “argument
graphs” [12] could help provide a precise underpinning for
threat modeling and quantitative evaluation of system-level
metrics. A particular challenge in constructing security argu-
ment graphs is that of dealing with the heterogeneous set of
information that needs to be incorporated, which may include
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Fig. 1: The security assessment framework proposed in [4].
security requirements, business processes, system architecture,
physical device specifications, known vulnerabilities, and at-
tacker models.
In [4], we presented a high-level workflow-oriented security
assessment framework, which organizes the diverse set of
information inputs described above. The overall assessment
process, which is illustrated in Fig. 1, relies on a unique
argument graph structure that progressively incorporates Goal,
System, and Attacker (GSA) information.
As a brief overview, the process starts with a precisely
defined security goal, which may relate to properties such
as Confidentiality, Integrity, or Availability. The analyst then
identifies system processes that are relevant to the secu-
rity goal, and represents them as workflow diagrams. Those
workflow diagrams provide a sequence of actions and their
respective actors. Those two inputs are combined to form a
simple argument graph, called a Goal (G) graph, that captures
information about actors and interactions that may affect the
security goal. When detailed system information (e.g., actor to
device mapping, network topology, or device configuration) is
available, we use the G-graph to integrate that information and
generate a more detailed security argument graph: the Goal,
System (GS) graph. Finally, we incorporate information about
possible attacker actions and capabilities into the GS-graph to
generate the Goal, System, Attacker (GSA) graph.
Our GSA graph structure, which is represented in Fig. 2, is
system-focused (like fault trees [19]), but allows for the mod-
eling of attacks (like attack graphs [16]). The graph contains
vertices of different types, such as system (attacker) actions
and system (attacker) properties. This graph structure has no
explicit vertices to denote aggregation semantics (e.g., OR re-
lations or AND relations), as each vertex contains information
that defines the aggregation of its incoming neighbors. Thus,
the graph has only a single type of dependency relationship
among the vertices.
III. ARGUMENT PATTERNS IN SECURITY ASSESSMENT
While applying our structured approach to generate se-
curity argument graphs (e.g., in the context of smart grid
infrastructure), we observed a series of recurring argument
patterns. These patterns capture direct logical relationships
among different pieces of information and may be used to
Fig. 2: Basic components of the argument graph: (a) the
workflow steps of the assessed process, (b) a system and
device property and its decomposition, and (c) a potential
attack step and its immediate connection to system property.
develop reusable extension templates that help automate the
graph generation process. In this section, we give an overview
of several useful argument patterns we identified in our work
on security assessments of processes in the smart grid domain.
We shall see that the patterns to be presented are fairly generic,
so they are applicable to other domains as well. In addition,
other domains might also contribute patterns that we have
not yet encountered. We formalize those patterns as extension
templates in Section IV-A.
In general, two classes of patterns occur in our arguments:
intra-type patterns, and inter-type patterns. As the name sug-
gests, intra-type patterns introduce and connect vertices of
the same type, and inter-type patterns introduce and connect
vertices of different types. The following describes the two
pattern classes in more detail and provide five example patterns
we identified. We number the patterns according to the order
in which they typically appear in our argument graphs in the
generation process.
Inter-Type patterns. Inter-type operations connect vertices of
different types. For example, at a high level, a security goal
is directly defined in the context of one or more workflows to
which the goal is related. We characterize such a relationship
by the following argument pattern P1: security goals or
requirements directly depend on processes that occur in the
system. As another example, consider the workflow steps in
our argument graph. Each workflow step is performed by one
or multiple actors with certain properties. This association of
workflow steps with actors is our argument pattern P3: to
successfully complete actions in the workflow, their respective
actors need to be available. In addition, these abstract actors
have to be mapped to concrete devices in the system to allow
a more detailed decomposition. That is our argument pattern
P4: devices in the system adopt one or more workflow actor
roles to provide functionality.
Intra-Type patterns. Workflows in the system have a number
of actions that have to be executed in sequence. Our graph
generation starts with the final step of a workflow, and then
adds its prerequisite step (i.e., the generation works backwards
in time). That is one of our argument patterns, pattern P2:
the successful completion of workflow actions may depend
on the other preceding or concurrent actions. For example,
assume that the final step in a workflow depends on the
receiving of a message. The intra-type pattern can be used to
identify the workflow step that is related to the transmission
of that message. Another important intra-type pattern relates
to specific devices (within a system) that may be involved
in a workflow. The refinement of device properties is pattern
P5: device properties depend on sub-properties and their com-
position semantics. For example, the availability of a device
depends on the availability of its software and hardware, so
this property can be decomposed.
In general, our argument patterns capture individual di-
rect logical relationships that make up the entire argument.
Such a focus on simple patterns of abstract relationships
allows us to apply the patterns with only local knowledge
of the argument graph. As each argument pattern captures
a generic relationship, we can construct our argument graph
using a small number of patterns. For an analogy, argument
patterns function like axioms that could be used to build up
a mathematical proof. Like axioms, argument patterns are
derived from logical relationships, best practices, common
scenarios, and expert knowledge. Thus, different patterns or
different ways of instantiating the same patterns are typically
required to tackle security problems of different nature, (e.g.,
availability vs. confidentiality). The patterns presented in this
paper are used to support an availability assessment use case
(see Section VI).
In the next section, we show how to formalize those
argument patterns by constructing extension templates. The
resulting set of extension templates allow us to automatically
generate an argument graph based on several classes of inputs
which drive the security assessment.
IV. GRAPH GENERATION BASED ON ARGUMENT
PATTERNS
So far, we have introduced the concept of argument patterns
that emerge during the construction of argument graphs; we
also provided several informal examples to illustrate our
intuition. We now present a formalism that rigorously defines
these patterns and the manner in which they can be applied. In
the following, we start with a formal definition of the security
argument graphs. We then formalize how to progressively
generate such graphs through the application of local exten-
sions. We define how a local extension is generated through
the instantiation of an extension template, which formalizes a
corresponding argument pattern. With all these building blocks
in place, we then present our overall process for generating
the graph.
A. Graph Structure and Local Extensions
We first define the structure of our graph and how a graph
can be generated by the application of local extensions.
Graph Definition. For the following discussion, a graph ωi
is defined to be a triple
ωi := 〈Vi, Ei, li〉 ,
where Vi is a finite set of vertices, Ei is a finite set of directed
edges, and li is the labeling function. Each vertex is itself a
static tuple that contains the type of the vertex, and some of
type-specific additional data. The type and data are set when
the vertex is created, and cannot be changed afterward. Two
vertices are considered identical whenever all their static data
are identical. An edge e = 〈vs, vt〉 is represented by a tuple
that contains references to its source vertex vs and target vertex
vt. The labeling function, li(v), returns the mutable attribute(s)
of a vertex v ∈ Vi. For example, a variable attribute could
be the probability that this vertex’s property is true (to be
determined in the graph evaluation later). Note that li(v) does
not need to be a single numerical value: it can encapsulate a
list of different types of information, such as an expression
relating the attributes of its incoming neighbors to its own
attribute.
Local extension. We progressively generate the security ar-
gument graph through the application of local extensions. A
local extension r is defined as a tuple of its matching vertex
vr and the resulting star graph ωr:
r := 〈vr, ωr〉
The resulting star graph ωr contains v and at least one
additional vertex. Each of these additional vertices has one
outgoing edge towards v. Other than those edges, there is no
other edge in ωr.
We use ωa
r
=⇒ ωb to denote the application of a local
extension r to a graph ωa, which generates a new graph ωb
(see Fig. 3). Here, we assume that r is applicable, i.e., the
matched vertex vr is indeed a vertex of ωa. Given that, the
local extension is applied as follows:
ωa
r
=⇒ ωb = 〈Va ∪ Vr, Ea ∪ Er, lb〉
where
lb(v) =
{
lr(v) if v ∈ (Vr \ Va) ∪ {vr}
la(v) otherwise.
The additional vertices from the star graph ωr and the
associated edges are added to the original graph. Note that
the additional vertices in ωr may or may not be present in the
original graph ωa. For each vertex that is already present in
the original graph ωa, except for v, the old labeling function
is preserved; otherwise, the labeling function is taken from the
star graph.
B. Extension Templates and Graph Generation
Having introduced local extensions, we now consider their
generation. We introduce the notion of an extension template,
γ := 〈mγ , fγ〉 ,
where mγ is a matching function and fγ is an extension gen-
eration function. Specifically, mγ(v,Σ) shows γ’s matching
score for vertex v, where Σ is the environment: a placeholder
for additional information. Recall that the attribute of a vertex
l(v) is a tuple that contains its type and type-specific additional
Fig. 3: Local extensions: Transformation of graph ωa using
local extension r into graph ωb (i.e. ωa
r
=⇒ ωb). The
local extension r matches v2, and inserts ωr in its place.
Slashed arrows denote logical connections between graphs.
For illustration purposes, the variable attribute of a vertex is
its color.
information, both of which can be used to determine the
numerical value of mγ(v,Σ). A value of mγ(v,Σ) = 0 means
that extension template γ is not applicable to the generation
of an extension for v. If multiple extension templates are
applicable (i.e., several extension templates can be applied to
the same vertex), then mγ could be implemented as chosen
from a range, to indicate precedence. Otherwise, mγ can be
implemented as a Boolean function indicating applicability of
γ.
If an extension template γ is applicable to a vertex v,
the local extension generation function fγ(v,Σ) uses the
information from vertex v and environment Σ to generate a
local extension that can be used to expand v. In that case,
Σ is a placeholder for various pieces of information that
are relevant to the transformation of the graph, such as the
workflow information, the actor-to-component mapping, or
the network topology graphs. We use Γ to denote the set of
extension templates.
Graph Generation Algorithm. We define graph generation
as the repeated application of a set of extension templates to a
graph. More formally, it is the application of Γ to a graph
ωa, using the environment Σ. The underlying algorithm is
summarized as pseudocode in Algorithm 1 below.
ID Comment
T1 Template to connect goal node to assessed workflow(s)
T2 Template to look up required previous steps in a workflow
T3 Template to create requirements for the actor of a workflow step
T4 Template to create device requirements for an actor
T5 Template to decompose requirements for devices
T6 Template to identify potential attacks on leaf properties
T7 Template to create requirements for an attack step
TABLE I: A sample set of extension templates.
Algorithm 1: Graph generation loop
In the pseudocode, VERTICES(ωa) returns all vertices
of the graph, while GETMATCHINGTEMPLATES(v,Γ) re-
turns a set Γv of all templates applicable to v, and
GETONEELEMENT(U) simply picks an arbitrary element of
the set U . Note that when no template is applicable, Γv = ∅,
whereas when several templates are applicable, the one with
the highest matching score mγ is chosen. In Table I, we list
some of those extension templates and describe their functions.
The template numbering corresponds to the pattern numbering
in Section III; the set has been expanded to include two
additional templates, which relate to attacker modeling. Here,
we concentrate on extension templates related to availability
of a process, matching our case study in Section VI. We
are currently working on additional extension templates to
model the transmission path of messages, human-machine
interactions, and more complex workflow mechanisms.
V. USING EXTENSION TEMPLATES TO GENERATE
ARGUMENT GRAPHS
Our security assessment process [4], shown in Fig. 1,
contains three types of security argument graph: the G-graph,
GS-graph, and GSA-graph. All of those graphs are generated
through application of Algorithm 1; the differences arise from
the specific inputs provided and the extension templates used
for graph generation. The meta-process for constructing the
argument graphs is:
ωg ← GENERATEGRAPH(ω0,Γg,Σg)
ωgs ← GENERATEGRAPH(ωg,Γs,Σs)
ωgsa ← GENERATEGRAPH(ωgs,Γa,Σa)
In the following three subsections, we describe individual
steps, their inputs, and the associated templates in greater
detail. Finally, in Section V-D, we focus on a single template to
illustrate the level of specification required, and the importance
of templates in automating the graph generation process.
A. Graph Generation Using Workflow Input
To generate the first stage of our argument graph,
the G-graph, Algorithm 1 is called as follows:
GENERATEGRAPH(ω0,Γg,Σg). That will generate the
G-graph, which includes the workflow input in Σg , and is
based on an initial base-graph ω0 and a set of extension
templates Γg . The initial graph will contain only a vertex
representing the goal of the assessment. Γg contains T1, T2,
and T3, the formal extension templates for patterns P1, P2,
and P3 as defined in Section III.
Workflow information in Σg . The workflow input describes
how the system provides a functionality, and identifies nec-
essary actors as well as the information they exchange. Our
internal structure for this input is a workflow graph: ωw =
〈Vw, Ew, lw〉. For v ∈ Vw, v = 〈type, attributesTuple〉.
Workflow vertices have only one type of vertex: TYPE(v) ∈
{WorkflowStep}. A vertex’s attributesTuple field depends on
its type. For simplicity, in the following we consider only
sequential workflows, with workflow step vertices. The at-
tribute tuple of each workflow step vertex has two static
attributes: actor and action. Thus, the attributeTuple is
〈actor, action〉. The labeling function lw is used to store
additional workflow information, e.g., on branching, merging,
and conditions in the workflow.
Argument graph vertex types and templates Γg . We con-
struct our argument graph iteratively, starting with ω0, which
is a directed graph with the assessment goal as its only
vertex. The assessment goal determines which properties of
the system we are interested in, for example, the availability
of the components involved in a workflow. The goal vertex
is directly created from user input, without any need for
an extension template. This goal vertex is then connected
to the final step of the assessed workflow, using extension
template T1 (which implements P1: see Section III). Then,
that final workflow step vertex is connected to the required
previous steps in the workflow using T2 (implementing P2),
and those steps are expanded as well. All vertices generated
by T1 and T2 will be of type “ActionAvailability.” In addi-
tion, required properties for each actor, such as actor and
communication link availability, are added using extension
template T3 (implementing P3). That will add vertices of
type “ActorAvailability” and “MessageAvailability.” A vertex
with type “ActionAvailability” has static attributes action
and actor. For example, in the context of the smart grid,
the action can be “MeterReading,” and the actor can be
“Utility”. A vertex with type “ActorAvailability”, has static
attribute actor. For example, the actor can be “Utility.”
We call the resulting graph at this stage the G-graph, as it
models the immediate requirements related to the goal of the
assessment.
Fig. 4: Examples of a device type hierarchy (a) and compo-
sition tree (b). The device types are based on the power grid
substation example, with an HMI (Human-Machine Interface),
PLC (Programmable Logic Controller), and RTU (Remote
Terminal Unit).
B. Graph Generation Using System Input
As the next step, the argument graph ωG is expanded
using Algorithm 1, this time with different operands:
GENERATEGRAPH(ωg,Γs,Σs). Here, the operands are the
system information Σs and a set of extension templates Γs.
Here, Γg contains T4 and T5, the formal extension templates
for patterns P4 and P5.
System information inputs. The system description contains
multiple types of inputs, including the following.
• An actor-to-component mapping: This is similar to the
deployment diagram in UML. It maps the actor from the
workflow to a componentType.
• A network topology graph ωn = 〈Vn, En, ln〉, where each
vertex v ∈ Vn is a physical device in the system, and each
edge e ∈ En is a link (which can be a single-hop physical
communication link, a network path, or physical). The
attribute function ln(v) describes various attributes of a
device v, including its type, physical location, and access
privileges, among others. For a link e, ln(e) describes its
attributes, like type, capacity, and delay.
• A componentType hierarchy diagram as depicted in
Fig. 4a.
• The device composition information as depicted in
Fig. 4b.
Vertex types and templates for GS-graph generation. Based
on those inputs, two extension templates can be applied to the
argument graph: T4 and T5. T4 makes it possible to connect
the abstract actor in the workflow with the concrete device
that executes this action, thus introducing “ComponentAvail-
ability” vertices to the graph. A vertex of that type has 2
static attributes: component and componentType. The
componentType is taken from a hierarchy of device types
with increasing specificity towards the graph’s leaves. The
component is taken from a tree that describes the subcom-
ponents for each componentType. If no subcomponent tree
is available for a given componentType, the subcomponent
tree of a parent componentType will be used instead. We
describe T5 in more detail in Section V-D.
C. Graph Generation Using Attacker Input
As the last step, the argument graph ωgs is expanded
using Algorithm 1, this time with different operands:
GENERATEGRAPH(ωgs,Γa,Σa). Here, the operands are the
(a)
(b)
Fig. 5: Details on extension template T5: (a) Pseudocode of the
extension function T5(v,Σa). (b) Visualization of the process.
system information Σa and a set of extension templates Γa.
The two patterns for the extension templates T6 and T7 in Γa
were not introduced earlier. They are similar to P2 and P3,
but relating to the attacker (instead of the system).
Attacker information input. The input placeholder Σa here
contains the attacker model, which contains a set of attacker
properties and a set of attack sequences Ωr (a set of star
graphs). Each star graph ωr contains a potential attack step and
its immediate prerequisites. The vertices in ωr are of type
“AttackStep” and “AttackerProperty.” Attacker property infor-
mation relates to methods, knowledge, and physical access of
the attacker, e.g., access to a company’s compound or server
room.
Vertex types and templates for GSA-graph generation. In
the GSA-graph, new vertices of type “AttackStep” and “At-
tackerProperty” are introduced (matching the nodes from the
attacker model). Under this model, only single step attacks and
their corresponding requirements can be modeled, however we
are developing additional vertex types to incorporate multi-
step attacks.
D. Automatic Generation using Templates
In the previous sections, we have introduced several ex-
tension templates that we distilled from common argument
patterns that we observed. As part of our effort toward au-
tomating the security assessment of complex systems, we are
compiling an extension template library. All of the extension
templates in Table I are defined in pseudocode. In this paper,
we present only the core set of templates we are currently
working on: additional extension templates are omitted from
this paper because of space limitations. We use the extension
template T5 (device decomposing requirements) to illustrate
the underlying extension process.
Extension template T5 relies on component type and device
composition hierarchies, which are specified as an input to
the security assessment (part of Σgs). Fig. 4 presents exam-
ples of the composition hierarchies, which were discussed
in Section V-B. Template T5 uses the supporting hierarchies
to expand a single graph vertex v. We show the extension
generation function in Fig. 5a and represent the process
graphically in Fig. 5b. In particular, the local extension for a
component property is created by finding the best matching
componentType from the componentType tree. That
best componentType is then used to find the matching prop-
erty composition tree, and to look up the next decomposition
for the current property. All potential decomposition nodes are
added to a star graph ωr, and returned together with the node
v as a local extension.
That precise description of the extension template appli-
cation process and required input information allows the
extension templates to be readily implemented in a software
tool. In the next section, we present an example security
assessment, and show that the process can be automated using
a supporting software tool that is currently under development.
VI. APPLICATION: AN ELECTRIC POWER GRID USE CASE
In this section, we apply the algorithms and templates pre-
sented earlier to an illustrative use case from the electric power
sector. We start by manually deriving a security argument
graph to explain important details. We then discuss graph
generation in CyberSAGE [20], a security assessment tool that
is currently under development. Using CyberSAGE, we can
generate the argument graph automatically, based on a library
of extension templates and a set of inputs.
A. Assessment Input
We consider an example power system use case adapted
from [3]. This scenario is a typical supervisory control and
data acquisition (SCADA) operation, connecting a utility com-
pany’s network with intelligent field devices that manipulate
physical power grid parameters. In this example, a central
distribution management system (DMS) monitors the voltage
at a specific point (i.e., bus) in the low voltage (LV) power
distribution network as reported by the power quality sensor
(PQS) there, and uses that information to trigger a control
action in another device located in the network. The control
device in this example is a distributed energy resource (DER),
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Fig. 6: Smart grid substation use case: (a) Voltage measurement and control workflow; (b) System topology.
e.g., an electric vehicle or small wind turbine. An example
workflow for the reactive power control process is shown in
Fig. 6a. Our security goal in this example is to ensure the
availability of the measurement and control process. A simpli-
fied system diagram is shown in Fig. 6b, which includes both
communication links (red) and physical power network con-
nectivity (black). Wide-area communication between different
physical locations is indicated by dashed edges. In the system
shown in Fig. 6b, RTU-1 is the device measuring the bus
voltage, while RTU-2 is responsible for controlling the DER’s
reactive power output. Both devices are of componentType
RTU. A server device (componentType “server”) in the
corporate network, DMS-A, is responsible for distribution
management functionality.
The attacker model in this example includes attacks (i.e.,
“AttackStep” vertices) targeting:
• Device power supply (Physical Tampering)
• Device operating system (Exploit Vulnerability)
• Device network connectivity (Denial of Service)
The “AttackerProperty” information that enables these attack
steps is specific to the class of device being targeted.
B. Security Argument Graphs
Knowledge of the assessment goal, the workflow (Fig. 6a),
and the system (Fig. 6b) inputs, the actor componentType
mapping, and an attacker model allows us to apply the
extension templates defined in Table I to construct a security
argument graph according to our framework [4]. The graph
generation process is depicted visually in Fig. 7. First, the
base graph (representing the goal) is extended using workflow
input. Extension templates T1 to T3 are used during this
stage to identify dependencies between actions and actors.
Next, templates T4 and T5 are used to enrich the argument
graph with system-specific information (GS-graph). The fully
developed GSA-graph, formed by applying T6 and T7, is
shown at the bottom of Fig. 7.
This complete security argument graph (GSA-graph) orga-
nizes security-related information that originated from dis-
parate sources and formats. The human-readable structure
is intended to help system designers and other stakeholders
understand dependencies and possible security threats in a
complex system. In particular, it is clear from Fig. 7 that
the distribution management system (DMS) is critical to the
voltage control process—it is involved in 3 separate actions,
occuring at different times. However, since the DMS is located
in the utility’s back-office network it may pose less of a
security risk than the DER, which is a field device. While
this analysis is qualitative, the GSA-graph can be used for
quantitative security assessment as well. In [4] we outline
an approach for quantitative evaluation over the argument
graph. That quantitative evaluation has been refined and is
implemented in our software tool, which is discussed below.
C. Automation in the CyberSAGE Tool
We implemented the proposed template-based graph gener-
ation using our prototype assessment tool, which we call Cy-
berSAGE (Cyber Security Argument Graph Evaluation) [20].
Based on the inputs described in Section VI, CyberSAGE is
able to automatically generate the argument graph. Screen-
shots of the system input and part of the GSA-graph are shown
in Fig. 8a and Fig. 8b, respectively.
The workflow and system inputs are given to CyberSAGE in
XML format. Currently, our tool does not provide functionality
to edit these inputs; it depends on other applications, such as
XML/text editors, to obtain and modify them. For example,
CyberSAGE imports the system topology input directly from
save files of the CSET tool1. Once CyberSAGE has imported
those files, it builds its internal data structures and visualizes
their contents in a user-friendly manner (see Fig. 8a).
The remaining inputs, namely the attacker models and
extension templates, are currently static and provided by Cy-
berSAGE. With the extension templates implemented, Cyber-
SAGE automatically builds the argument graph by following
Algorithm 1. It takes the tool less than 1 second to produce
the final argument graph, which contains around 50 vertices.
The tool also provides some degree of customization, such as
1The Cyber Security Evaluation Tool: ics-cert.us-cert.gov/satool.html
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Fig. 7: Manually derived security argument graphs for the distribution automation use case. Each edge is annotated to show
the extension template applied during graph generation.
(a)
(b)
Fig. 8: CyberSAGE prototype: (a) System input configuration (topology, device information, mapping of actors to devices).
(b) Part of the GSA graph, automatically generated using the extension templates introduced in this paper.
allowing the user to enable or disable a particular subset of
extension templates when building the graph.
VII. RELATED WORK
We see parallels between our work on security argument
graph generation and work from the safety and reliability
communities, as well as related efforts within the security do-
main. In this section, we discuss related efforts in graph-based
modeling and highlight unique features of our framework.
Safety case generation. A safety case uses certain argu-
ment strategies to organize a body of evidence so as to
provide a compelling case for supporting certain safety claims
(goals) [8]. Safety cases are typically constructed manually.
Recent efforts (e.g., [6], [5]) have begun to introduce formal
semantics to help automate the safety case generation process.
Compared with those recent efforts, our proposed approach
focuses on argument patterns that incorporate various security-
related evidence, including security goals and attacker models.
We also formalize the template in a local way, which simplifies
the definition and instantiation of the template while still
allowing progressive generation of the argument graph.
Fault tree generation. Fault tree analysis is a classic deduc-
tive method used to determine what combinations of basic
component failures can lead to a system-level fault event [19].
While fault trees are usually constructed manually in practice,
there has been a steady stream of efforts to automate the fault
tree generation process. For example, Pai et al. [14] propose
a method to transform a UML system model to dynamic
fault trees. Joshi et al. [7] propose a method to automatically
generate a dynamic fault tree from an Architectural Analysis
and Design Language (AADL) model. Recently, Xiang et
al. [21] propose an automatic synthesis method to generate
a static fault tree from a system model specified with SysML.
Compared with that line of work, our proposed approach not
only considers various security-specific information, but also
intends to cover a broader scope of security-related claims and
heterogeneous pieces of evidence.
Attack trees and other security assessment techniques.
Attack trees and their variations (e.g., attack graphs [16],
[13], ADVISE [11], and attack-defense trees [9]) have been
shown to be useful for security assessment. Inspired by the
fault tree formalism, an attack tree graphically represents how
a potential threat can be realized through various possible
combinations of attacks. Attack trees are usually constructed
manually. For the specific domain of network security, mul-
tiple efforts (e.g., [16], [13]) have tried to automate the
generation of attack graphs, which are meant to model how
an attacker can use staged attacks to compromise certain
assets in a network. ADVISE [11] automates the search of
attack strategies. Those efforts differ from ours in that they
do not provide a framework that can automatically integrate
heterogeneous pieces of information (e.g., relating to security
goals, workflows, system information, and the attacker) to
produce a holistic security argument.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we consider graph-based security assessment
for complex systems. Such assessments can be used to identify
potential attacks and to compare the security properties of
different designs. Because of the size of real-world systems,
the assessment process should ideally be tool-supported and
automated to a large extent. In [4] we proposed a holistic
security assessment framework that combines a collection
of heterogeneous input information into a security argument
graph. Building on that work, in this paper we identify a
collection of argument patterns that emerge from relation-
ships between input classes. We formalize these patterns as
extension templates, and provide a method for automated
graph generation using these templates. We describe how we
implemented the proposed method in our security assessment
tool, CyberSAGE, and demonstrate the automated generation
process for an example use case from the power sector.
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